Posthuman

Posthuman names a being whose general capacities exceed the maximum attainable by any current human, to a degree that would put it outside the category "human" as that category is currently used. The word carries a second, largely unrelated meaning in the humanities, where posthumanism is a critique of the humanist picture of the self-contained rational subject rather than a forecast about future beings. The two usages share a prefix and almost nothing else, and the resulting confusion is a persistent feature of the literature.

§Transhuman, posthuman, and the gradient

In transhumanist writing the two terms mark positions on a continuum. A transhuman is a person in transition: someone using enhancement technologies but still recognisably a member of the species. A posthuman lies beyond that, past whatever threshold makes the species label stop applying. FM-2030 introduced the transitional sense in the 1970s, describing transhumans as evolutionary intermediaries identifiable by their reproductive choices, prostheses, mobility and rejection of traditional social forms.

The difficulty is that nobody has specified where the threshold sits, and most attempts to place it collapse under examination. A person with a Cochlear implant and a pacemaker who lives to 110 is not posthuman on anyone's account. A brain emulation running at a thousand times biological speed would be on almost everyone's. Between those poles the concept provides no principled cut, which is why careful writers treat "posthuman" as a direction rather than a status.

§Origins of the term

1. 1957
   Huxley's transhumanism
   Julian Huxley argues that the human species can transcend itself deliberately, and proposes 'transhumanism' as the name for the project.
2. 1973–1989
   FM-2030's transitional human
   Fereidoun Esfandiary describes transhumans as the earliest manifestations of a new evolutionary stage, and posthumans as what follows.
3. 1977
   Posthumanism named
   Literary theorist Ihab Hassan asks whether Western culture is entering a posthumanist phase in which the humanist subject no longer holds.
4. 1985
   The cyborg as figure
   Donna Haraway's cyborg manifesto uses the human–machine hybrid to attack the boundaries between organism, machine and gender.
5. 1990
   Extropian formulation
   Max More's founding transhumanist essays set out posthumanity as an explicit goal rather than a diagnosis of the present.
6. 1999
   How We Became Posthuman
   N. Katherine Hayles traces how information came to be treated as separable from its material substrate, and argues against that separation.
7. 2008
   A capacity-based definition
   Nick Bostrom defines a posthuman as a being with at least one general capacity far beyond any unaided human's, naming healthspan, cognition and emotion.

§The transhumanist definition

The most-cited technical definition is Nick Bostrom's. A posthuman capacity is a general central capacity greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human without recourse to new technological means; a posthuman is a being with at least one such capacity.¹ Bostrom names three central capacities: healthspan, the capacity to remain fully healthy and active; cognition, general intellectual capacities including memory and abstract reasoning; and emotion, the capacity to enjoy life and to respond appropriately to people and situations.

Three features of this definition do real work. It is capacity-based, so it says nothing about what a posthuman is made of; a biologically modified human, an emulation, and an engineered organism could all qualify. It is disjunctive, requiring only one capacity to cross the line, which is why radical life extension alone would count. And it is comparative to the current maximum, not to the average, which sets a high bar: a drug that lifts a typical person to the level of an unusually healthy one is enhancement, not posthumanity.

Terminology

"Posthuman" and "posthumanism" are not the same word with different endings. Posthuman is a noun for a possible being; posthumanism is an intellectual position about the concept of the human. A scholar can be a posthumanist and regard posthumans as a naive fantasy, and many are.

The definition also deliberately avoids the question of moral status. Bostrom's essay is a reply to the charge that posthuman existence would be undesirable or unintelligible, and argues that healthspan, cognition and emotion are goods whose extreme versions people already recognise as valuable when they encounter unusually healthy, clever or emotionally resilient people. The argument concerns desirability, not feasibility, and Bostrom is explicit that it establishes nothing about whether such beings can be built.

§Critical posthumanism

The humanities tradition begins from a different question: not what comes after humans, but what was wrong with the concept of the human in the first place. Ihab Hassan's 1977 essay put the question in circulation; Donna Haraway's cyborg gave it a figure.² The target is the humanist subject inherited from the Enlightenment — autonomous, disembodied in its reasoning, implicitly male, European and able-bodied — and the boundaries it maintains against animals, machines and the environment.

N. Katherine Hayles's How We Became Posthuman is the pivotal text for this wiki's subject matter because it is directly about the ideas covered here.³ Hayles traces how mid-century cybernetics came to treat information as a pattern that could be abstracted from any particular material carrier, and argues that this move — not any technology — is what created the posthuman imaginary. Her objection to Mind uploading is not that the engineering is hard but that the premise of Substrate independence smuggles in a fantasy of escape from the body which the science does not support. She ends the book arguing for a posthuman that recognises embodiment as constitutive rather than incidental.

Cary Wolfe pushes the point further, arguing that transhumanism is not a break with humanism but its intensification: it takes the humanist ideals of autonomy, mastery and rational self-improvement and proposes to achieve them more completely.⁴ Rosi Braidotti's version shifts the emphasis to anti-anthropocentrism, extending moral consideration across species and questioning why human flourishing should be the organising value at all.

§Two traditions, one word

The traditions rarely engage. Transhumanist writing on posthumanity is largely analytic philosophy and applied futurism, concerned with capacities, probabilities and ethical permissibility. Critical posthumanism is largely continental theory, concerned with subject formation, representation and power. Each occasionally treats the other as a straw man: the first reads the second as wordplay, the second reads the first as Californian ideology with a philosophy department attached.

A third usage confuses matters further. Francis Fukuyama's Our Posthuman Future uses "posthuman" pejoratively, to name the outcome bioconservatives fear: a world in which biotechnology has dissolved the shared human nature he takes to ground equal political rights.⁵ That argument is set out in Bioconservatism, and it borrows the transhumanist sense of the word while reversing its valence.

Is the posthuman a threshold or a direction?

Bostrom's definition implies a crossing point, since a capacity either exceeds the current human maximum or does not. Critics inside transhumanism note that capacities are continuous and technology-relative: literacy, spectacles and antibiotics have all raised human maxima, so the reference class keeps moving and the threshold recedes as it is approached.

§Objections

The definitional objection is that "greatly exceeding" is unquantified and does no work. A being that lives to 200 and one that lives to 20,000 both satisfy it, though almost nothing else about them is comparable.

The empirical objection is that no central capacity has yet been pushed past the human maximum by any technology. Assistive devices restore function; Nootropics produce small and inconsistent effects in healthy adults; Genetic enhancement of cognition is limited by the polygenic architecture of the traits involved; brain–computer interfaces currently return a fraction of natural capability to people who have lost it. Every proposed route to posthumanity is at an earlier stage than its advocates' timelines assume, and this wiki's per-article readiness assessments reflect that gap.

The identity objection asks whether the posthuman would be the same person as the human who became one — the problem treated in Personal identity and continuity. Gradual modification looks survivable on most theories; a single discontinuous transformation does not.

The political objection, made from both the left and the disability-rights tradition, is that positing a superior future being encodes a judgement about present ones. If a posthuman is defined by capacities, then existing people are ranked by how far short they fall, a structure examined in Disability rights and enhancement and one reason Morphological freedom is framed as a right to self-modification rather than an obligation to improve.

§Outlook

No agreed criterion exists for recognising a posthuman if one appeared, and the candidates are not converging. A capacity threshold makes the category depend on a moving human maximum. A substrate criterion excludes biologically enhanced humans and includes any sufficiently capable machine, which collapses the term into Artificial general intelligence. A phenomenological criterion would require settling the questions raised in Machine consciousness, which remain open. The unresolved issue is whether "posthuman" picks out a natural kind at all, or whether it functions as a placeholder for whatever lies past the current limits of imagination about human capability — a placeholder that each generation refills with the technologies it happens to have.

§See also

• Transhumanism
• Human enhancement
• Nick Bostrom
• Bioconservatism
• Substrate independence
• Morphological freedom
• Future of humanity
• Technological singularity

§References