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Emulation, uploading, and identity — what it would take to run a person on different hardware, and whether the result would be them.
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Swedish computational neuroscientist and futures researcher who co-wrote the whole brain emulation roadmap and works on the physical limits of long-term civilization.
A hypothetical artificial system matching or exceeding competent human performance across essentially all cognitive tasks rather than in narrow domains.
Preserving the structural information in a brain well enough that a future technology could reconstruct its memories, rather than revive the tissue itself.
Systems that link one nervous system to another by decoding activity from a sender and delivering stimulation to a receiver, so far at rates of a few bits per minute.
The mapping of complete wiring diagrams of nervous systems, from macroscale fibre tracts down to every synapse in a volume of tissue.
The persistence of a person in digital form after death, ranging from chatbot reconstructions built from their data to the hypothetical emulation of their brain.
The proposal that humans and artificial intelligence will form a single cognitive system rather than remaining separate agents that merely use one another.
The project of raising human problem-solving capacity by improving the tools, notations and organisations that thinking runs on rather than by altering the brain.
The question of whether an artificial system can have subjective experience, how anyone could tell, and what would follow morally if one did.
An implanted device intended to restore or improve memory formation by supplying the pattern of neural activity a damaged or underperforming hippocampus fails to generate.
The question of what can be inferred about a person's mental states from neural and physiological recordings, and what protection that information should receive.
The hypothetical transfer of a person's mind to a computational substrate, such that the resulting process is that person rather than a description of them.
The minimal neural activity jointly sufficient for a specific conscious experience, and the experimental programme that tries to identify it.
The inference of a stimulus, intention, or mental state from measured neural activity, and the statistical machinery that makes brain–computer interfaces work.
The question of what makes a person at one time the same person as at another, and what — if anything — must be preserved for that person to survive.
The administration of serotonergic psychedelics or MDMA alongside psychological support for psychiatric conditions, in trials that cannot be reliably blinded.
American inventor and futurist who formulated the law of accelerating returns and forecasts human-level machine intelligence by 2029 and a technological singularity by 2045.
The belief that a technological singularity is likely and that it should be actively prepared for, together with the movements organized around that belief.
The claim that mental states depend on a system's functional organization rather than on the material implementing it, so that a mind could run on non-biological hardware.
The hypothesized point at which machine intelligence begins improving itself fast enough that technological change outruns human ability to predict or steer it.
A thought experiment in which a person is scanned, destroyed, and rebuilt elsewhere, used to test whether survival requires physical continuity or only psychological continuity.
A proposed procedure for reproducing a particular mind by scanning one brain's structure in detail, building a computational model from the scan, and running it.