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categories: ["foundations", "society"]categories: ["foundations", "society"]tags: ["transhumanism", "posthumanism", "identity", "enhancement", "philosophy", "critical theory"]tags: ["transhumanism", "posthumanism", "identity", "enhancement", "philosophy", "critical theory"]summary: "A hypothetical being whose central capacities exceed the human maximum, and, in a separate scholarly tradition, a critique of the humanist subject itself."summary: "A hypothetical being whose central capacities exceed the human maximum, and, in a separate scholarly tradition, a critique of the humanist subject itself."updated: "2026-07-27"updated: "2026-10-29"------ ```infobox```infoboxlines 37–45 → 37–4523 unchanged lines not shown
```timeline```timeline[[ { "year": "1957", "title": "Huxley's transhumanism", "text": "Julian Huxley argues that the human species can transcend itself deliberately, and proposes 'transhumanism' as the name for the project." }, { "year": "1957", "title": "Huxley's transhumanism", "text": "Julian Huxley argues that the human species can transcend itself deliberately, and proposes 'transhumanism' as the name for the project." }, { "year": "1973–1989", "title": "FM-2030's transitional human", "text": "Fereidoun Esfandiary describes transhumans as the earliest manifestations of a new evolutionary stage, and posthumans as what follows." }, { "year": "1973-1989", "title": "FM-2030's transitional human", "text": "Fereidoun Esfandiary describes transhumans as the earliest manifestations of a new evolutionary stage, and posthumans as what follows." }, { "year": "1977", "title": "Posthumanism named", "text": "Literary theorist Ihab Hassan asks whether Western culture is entering a posthumanist phase in which the humanist subject no longer holds." }, { "year": "1977", "title": "Posthumanism named", "text": "Literary theorist Ihab Hassan asks whether Western culture is entering a posthumanist phase in which the humanist subject no longer holds." }, { "year": "1985", "title": "The cyborg as figure", "text": "Donna Haraway's cyborg manifesto uses the human–machine hybrid to attack the boundaries between organism, machine and gender." }, { "year": "1985", "title": "The cyborg as figure", "text": "Donna Haraway's cyborg manifesto uses the human-machine hybrid to attack the boundaries between organism, machine and gender." }, { "year": "1990", "title": "Extropian formulation", "text": "Max More's founding transhumanist essays set out posthumanity as an explicit goal rather than a diagnosis of the present." }, { "year": "1990", "title": "Extropian formulation", "text": "Max More's founding transhumanist essays set out posthumanity as an explicit goal rather than a diagnosis of the present." }, { "year": "1999", "title": "How We Became Posthuman", "text": "N. Katherine Hayles traces how information came to be treated as separable from its material substrate, and argues against that separation." }, { "year": "1999", "title": "How We Became Posthuman", "text": "N. Katherine Hayles traces how information came to be treated as separable from its material substrate, and argues against that separation." }, { "year": "2008", "title": "A capacity-based definition", "text": "Nick Bostrom defines a posthuman as a being with at least one general capacity far beyond any unaided human's, naming healthspan, cognition and emotion." } { "year": "2008", "title": "A capacity-based definition", "text": "Nick Bostrom defines a posthuman as a being with at least one general capacity far beyond any unaided human's, naming healthspan, cognition and emotion." }lines 50–56 → 50–564 unchanged lines not shown
The most-cited technical definition is [[nick-bostrom]]'s. A *posthuman capacity* is a general central capacity greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human without recourse to new technological means; a posthuman is a being with at least one such capacity.[^bostrom2008] Bostrom names three central capacities: **healthspan**, the capacity to remain fully healthy and active; **cognition**, general intellectual capacities including memory and abstract reasoning; and **emotion**, the capacity to enjoy life and to respond appropriately to people and situations.The most-cited technical definition is [[nick-bostrom]]'s. A *posthuman capacity* is a general central capacity greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any current human without recourse to new technological means; a posthuman is a being with at least one such capacity.[^bostrom2008] Bostrom names three central capacities: **healthspan**, the capacity to remain fully healthy and active; **cognition**, general intellectual capacities including memory and abstract reasoning; and **emotion**, the capacity to enjoy life and to respond appropriately to people and situations. Three features of this definition do real work. It is *capacity-based*, so it says nothing about what a posthuman is made of; a biologically modified human, an emulation, and an engineered organism could all qualify. It is *disjunctive*, requiring only one capacity to cross the line, which is why radical [[longevity-escape-velocity|life extension]] alone would count. And it is *comparative to the current maximum*, not to the average, which sets a high bar: a drug that lifts a typical person to the level of an unusually healthy one is enhancement, not posthumanity.Three features of the definition carry its weight. It is *capacity-based*, so it says nothing about what a posthuman is made of; a biologically modified human, an emulation, and an engineered organism could all qualify. It is *disjunctive*, requiring only one capacity to cross the line, which is why radical [[longevity-escape-velocity|life extension]] alone would count. And it is *comparative to the current maximum*, not to the average, which sets a high bar: a drug that lifts a typical person to the level of an unusually healthy one is enhancement, not posthumanity. > [!note] Terminology> [!note] Terminology> "Posthuman" and "posthumanism" are not the same word with different endings. Posthuman is a noun for a possible being; posthumanism is an intellectual position about the concept of the human. A scholar can be a posthumanist and regard posthumans as a naive fantasy, and many are.> "Posthuman" and "posthumanism" are not the same word with different endings. Posthuman is a noun for a possible being; posthumanism is an intellectual position about the concept of the human. A scholar can be a posthumanist and regard posthumans as a naive fantasy, and many are.lines 59–69 → 59–692 unchanged lines not shown
## Critical posthumanism## Critical posthumanism The humanities tradition begins from a different question: not what comes after humans, but what was wrong with the concept of the human in the first place. Ihab Hassan's 1977 essay put the question in circulation; Donna Haraway's cyborg gave it a figure.[^haraway1985] The target is the humanist subject inherited from the Enlightenment — autonomous, disembodied in its reasoning, implicitly male, European and able-bodied — and the boundaries it maintains against animals, machines and the environment.The humanities tradition begins from a different question. It asks what was wrong with the concept of the human in the first place, rather than what comes after humans. Ihab Hassan's 1977 essay put the question in circulation; Donna Haraway's cyborg gave it a figure.[^haraway1985] The target is the humanist subject inherited from the Enlightenment (autonomous, disembodied in its reasoning, implicitly male, European and able-bodied) and the boundaries it maintains against animals, machines and the environment. N. Katherine Hayles's *How We Became Posthuman* is the pivotal text for this wiki's subject matter because it is directly about the ideas covered here.[^hayles1999] Hayles traces how mid-century cybernetics came to treat information as a pattern that could be abstracted from any particular material carrier, and argues that this move — not any technology — is what created the posthuman imaginary. Her objection to [[mind-uploading]] is not that the engineering is hard but that the premise of [[substrate-independence]] smuggles in a fantasy of escape from the body which the science does not support. She ends the book arguing for a posthuman that recognises embodiment as constitutive rather than incidental.N. Katherine Hayles's *How We Became Posthuman* is the pivotal text for this wiki's subject matter, because it deals directly with the ideas covered here.[^hayles1999] Hayles traces how mid-century cybernetics came to treat information as a pattern that could be abstracted from any particular material carrier, and argues that this move, rather than any technology, created the posthuman imaginary. Her objection to [[mind-uploading]] concerns its premise rather than its engineering: the premise of [[substrate-independence]], she argues, smuggles in a fantasy of escape from the body which the science does not support. She ends the book arguing for a posthuman that recognises embodiment as constitutive rather than incidental. Cary Wolfe pushes the point further, arguing that transhumanism is not a break with humanism but its intensification: it takes the humanist ideals of autonomy, mastery and rational self-improvement and proposes to achieve them more completely.[^wolfe2010] Rosi Braidotti's version shifts the emphasis to anti-anthropocentrism, extending moral consideration across species and questioning why human flourishing should be the organising value at all.Cary Wolfe pushes the point further, arguing that transhumanism intensifies humanism rather than breaking with it: it takes the humanist ideals of autonomy, mastery and rational self-improvement and proposes to achieve them more completely.[^wolfe2010] Rosi Braidotti's version shifts the emphasis to anti-anthropocentrism, extending moral consideration across species and questioning why human flourishing should be the organising value at all. ## Two traditions, one word## Two traditions, one word lines 78–92 → 78–928 unchanged lines not shown
The definitional objection is that "greatly exceeding" is unquantified and does no work. A being that lives to 200 and one that lives to 20,000 both satisfy it, though almost nothing else about them is comparable.The definitional objection is that "greatly exceeding" is unquantified and does no work. A being that lives to 200 and one that lives to 20,000 both satisfy it, though almost nothing else about them is comparable. The empirical objection is that no central capacity has yet been pushed past the human maximum by any technology. Assistive devices restore function; [[nootropics]] produce small and inconsistent effects in healthy adults; [[genetic-enhancement-of-intelligence]] is limited by the polygenic architecture of the traits involved; [[brain-computer-interface|brain–computer interfaces]] currently return a fraction of natural capability to people who have lost it. Every proposed route to posthumanity is at an earlier stage than its advocates' timelines assume, and this wiki's per-article readiness assessments reflect that gap.The empirical objection is that no central capacity has yet been pushed past the human maximum by any technology. Assistive devices restore function; [[nootropics]] produce small and inconsistent effects in healthy adults; [[genetic-enhancement-of-intelligence]] is limited by the polygenic architecture of the traits involved; [[brain-computer-interface|brain-computer interfaces]] currently return a fraction of natural capability to people who have lost it. Every proposed route to posthumanity is at an earlier stage than its advocates' timelines assume, and this wiki's per-article readiness assessments reflect that gap. The identity objection asks whether the posthuman would be the same person as the human who became one — the problem treated in [[personal-identity-and-continuity]]. Gradual modification looks survivable on most theories; a single discontinuous transformation does not.The identity objection asks whether the posthuman would be the same person as the human who became one, the problem treated in [[personal-identity-and-continuity]]. Gradual modification looks survivable on most theories; a single discontinuous transformation does not. The political objection, made from both the left and the disability-rights tradition, is that positing a superior future being encodes a judgement about present ones. If a posthuman is defined by capacities, then existing people are ranked by how far short they fall, a structure examined in [[disability-rights-and-enhancement]] and one reason [[morphological-freedom]] is framed as a right to self-modification rather than an obligation to improve.The political objection, made from both the left and the disability-rights tradition, is that positing a superior future being encodes a judgement about present ones. If a posthuman is defined by capacities, then existing people are ranked by how far short they fall, a structure examined in [[disability-rights-and-enhancement]] and one reason [[morphological-freedom]] is framed as a right to self-modification rather than an obligation to improve. ## Outlook## Outlook No agreed criterion exists for recognising a posthuman if one appeared, and the candidates are not converging. A capacity threshold makes the category depend on a moving human maximum. A substrate criterion excludes biologically enhanced humans and includes any sufficiently capable machine, which collapses the term into [[artificial-general-intelligence]]. A phenomenological criterion would require settling the questions raised in [[machine-consciousness]], which remain open. The unresolved issue is whether "posthuman" picks out a natural kind at all, or whether it functions as a placeholder for whatever lies past the current limits of imagination about human capability — a placeholder that each generation refills with the technologies it happens to have.No agreed criterion exists for recognising a posthuman if one appeared, and the candidates are not converging. A capacity threshold makes the category depend on a moving human maximum. A substrate criterion excludes biologically enhanced humans and includes any sufficiently capable machine, which collapses the term into [[artificial-general-intelligence]]. A phenomenological criterion would require settling the questions raised in [[machine-consciousness]], which remain open. The unresolved issue is whether "posthuman" picks out a natural kind at all, or whether it functions as a placeholder for whatever lies past the current limits of imagination about human capability, refilled by each generation with the technologies it happens to have. ## See also## See also removed, struck through added, underlinedLine numbers count the serialised markdown of each revision, frontmatter included.
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