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categories: ["minds", "foundations"]categories: ["minds", "foundations"]tags: ["functionalism", "consciousness", "philosophy of mind", "uploading", "multiple realizability", "qualia"]tags: ["functionalism", "consciousness", "philosophy of mind", "uploading", "multiple realizability", "qualia"]summary: "The claim that mental states depend on a system's functional organization rather than on the material implementing it, so that a mind could run on non-biological hardware."summary: "The claim that mental states depend on a system's functional organization rather than on the material implementing it, so that a mind could run on non-biological hardware."updated: "2026-07-27"updated: "2026-08-23"issues: ["Aaronson's expander-graph objection and the 2023 open letter on IIT are described without citations."]issues: ["Aaronson's expander-graph objection and the 2023 open letter on IIT are described without citations."]------ lines 142–147 → 142–157128 unchanged lines not shown
support to be trusted, its verdict on non-biological systems inherits that support. Approaches tosupport to be trusted, its verdict on non-biological systems inherits that support. Approaches to[[machine-consciousness]] that assess systems against indicator properties drawn from multiple[[machine-consciousness]] that assess systems against indicator properties drawn from multipletheories are an attempt to make progress under that uncertainty.theories are an attempt to make progress under that uncertainty. > [!debate] What the disagreement is actually about> Both camps accept every physical fact about a functional duplicate and divide over what those facts> establish. Chalmers argues that a gradual replacement preserving functional organisation cannot> change experience without producing a subject systematically wrong about its own qualia;[^chalmers1995]> Searle answers that organisation is not the property doing the work, and that a system defined by> the formal relations among its states has no semantics of its own.[^searle1980] Neither position> predicts an observation the other denies, which is why no result from neuroscience has moved> anyone: a settled theory of consciousness would have to arrive first, and its verdict on> non-biological systems would then be inherited rather than tested. Meanwhile the thesis functions as a premise in arguments it cannot support on its own. Claims thatMeanwhile the thesis functions as a premise in arguments it cannot support on its own. Claims that[[cryonics]] or [[brain-preservation]] preserve a person, that an emulation would deserve moral[[cryonics]] or [[brain-preservation]] preserve a person, that an emulation would deserve moralremoved, struck through added, underlinedLine numbers count the serialised markdown of each revision, frontmatter included.
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