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categories: ["minds"]categories: ["minds"]tags: ["uploading", "emulation", "identity", "consciousness", "brain preservation", "functionalism"]tags: ["uploading", "emulation", "identity", "consciousness", "brain preservation", "functionalism"]summary: "The hypothetical transfer of a person's mind to a computational substrate, such that the resulting process is that person rather than a description of them."summary: "The hypothetical transfer of a person's mind to a computational substrate, such that the resulting process is that person rather than a description of them."updated: "2026-07-27"updated: "2026-10-29"issues: ["The Brain Preservation Foundation prize awards of 2016 and 2018 carry no citation."]issues: ["The Brain Preservation Foundation prize awards of 2016 and 2018 carry no citation."]------ lines 26–33 → 26–3312 unchanged lines not shown
`````` **Mind uploading** is the hypothetical transfer of a person's mental life onto a non-biological**Mind uploading** is the hypothetical transfer of a person's mental life onto a non-biologicalsubstrate, usually a computer, such that the resulting process has that person's memories,substrate, usually a computer, such that the resulting process has that person's memories andpersonality, and — on the strong version of the claim — that person's continued experience. Itpersonality and, on the strong version of the claim, that person's continued experience. Itcombines a technical proposal, [[whole-brain-emulation]], with a philosophical claim about whatcombines a technical proposal, [[whole-brain-emulation]], with a philosophical claim about whatmakes a future being the same person as an earlier one. The two components fail independently:makes a future being the same person as an earlier one. The two components fail independently:the emulation could work while the person does not survive it, and the identity argument could bethe emulation could work while the person does not survive it, and the identity argument could belines 38–50 → 38–504 unchanged lines not shown
Discussion of uploading tends to collapse three separable questions. First, can a computationalDiscussion of uploading tends to collapse three separable questions. First, can a computationalmodel of a specific brain be built and run so that it behaves as the original would? That is anmodel of a specific brain be built and run so that it behaves as the original would? That is anempirical question about scanning, modelling, and computation. Second, would such a model beempirical question about scanning, modelling, and computation. Second, would such a model beconscious — would there be something it is like to be it? That depends on unsettled theory, treatedconscious, in the sense that there would be something it is like to be it? That depends on unsettledunder [[machine-consciousness]] and [[neural-correlates-of-consciousness]]. Third, if the model istheory, treated under [[machine-consciousness]] and [[neural-correlates-of-consciousness]]. Third,conscious, is it the original person or a very good imitation? That is a question inif the model is conscious, is it the original person or a very good imitation? That is a question in[[personal-identity-and-continuity]], and it is not answerable by measurement.[[personal-identity-and-continuity]], and it is not answerable by measurement. Advocates generally hold that the answers are yes, yes, and yes, resting onAdvocates generally hold that the answers are yes, yes, and yes, resting on[[substrate-independence]] — the view that mental states depend on the organization of a system[[substrate-independence]], the view that mental states depend on the organization of a systemrather than the material implementing it. Critics reject one or more of the three at differentrather than the material implementing it. Critics reject one or more of the three at differentpoints, and the disagreements do not line up: a neuroscientist may doubt the engineering whilepoints, and the disagreements do not line up: a neuroscientist may doubt the engineering whileaccepting functionalism, and a philosopher may accept the engineering while denying that the uploadaccepting functionalism, and a philosopher may accept the engineering while denying that the uploadlines 56–66 → 56–665 unchanged lines not shown
The standard proposal is to fix or preserve a brain, image it at nanometre resolution, reconstructThe standard proposal is to fix or preserve a brain, image it at nanometre resolution, reconstructits structure using the methods of [[connectomics]], infer the parameters needed for a dynamicalits structure using the methods of [[connectomics]], infer the parameters needed for a dynamicalmodel, and run that model — the scan-translate-run pipeline set out in Anders Sandberg and Nickmodel, and run that model. This is the scan-translate-run pipeline set out in Anders Sandberg andBostrom's 2008 roadmap.[^sb2008] The brain is destroyed in the process — sectioning tissue for electronNick Bostrom's 2008 roadmap.[^sb2008] The brain is destroyed in the process, since sectioning tissuemicroscopy is not reversible. The upload therefore begins after the biological person is gone, whichfor electron microscopy is not reversible. The upload therefore begins after the biological personis what makes the identity question acute and what makes the procedure legally and ethicallyis gone, which is what makes the identity question acute and what makes the procedure legally andfraught even if it worked.ethically fraught even if it worked. ### Gradual replacement### Gradual replacement lines 70–76 → 70–763 unchanged lines not shown
there a gap, a copy, or two claimants. Nothing resembling the required device exists. It would havethere a gap, a copy, or two claimants. Nothing resembling the required device exists. It would haveto sit inside the skull, read the inputs and outputs of a single cell with high fidelity, reproduceto sit inside the skull, read the inputs and outputs of a single cell with high fidelity, reproduceits computation including dendritic nonlinearities and neuromodulatory sensitivity, and do soits computation including dendritic nonlinearities and neuromodulatory sensitivity, and do sowithout disrupting neighbours — an application well beyond anything discussed underwithout disrupting neighbours, an application well beyond anything discussed under[[medical-nanorobots]]. The gradual route is philosophically cleaner and technically far harder.[[medical-nanorobots]]. The gradual route is philosophically cleaner and technically far harder. > [!note] Terminology> [!note] Terminologylines 83–93 → 83–936 unchanged lines not shown
The minimum specification is unknown, which is the central practical problem. A wiring diagram aloneThe minimum specification is unknown, which is the central practical problem. A wiring diagram aloneis insufficient: it omits synaptic sign and strength, receptor composition, short-term plasticity,is insufficient: it omits synaptic sign and strength, receptor composition, short-term plasticity,and the neuromodulatory state that determines how a circuit behaves at a given moment. Long-termand the neuromodulatory state that determines how a circuit behaves at a given moment. Long-termmemory is generally thought to be stored in synaptic weights, but the molecular basis ismemory is generally thought to be stored in synaptic weights, but the molecular basis is contested.contested — persistent kinase activity, structural changes at the spine, and nuclear or epigeneticPersistent kinase activity, structural changes at the spine, and nuclear or epigenetic componentscomponents have all been proposed, and experiments transferring behavioural sensitization betweenhave all been proposed, and experiments transferring behavioural sensitization between sea slugs bysea slugs by RNA injection were read by some as evidence that not everything lives at theRNA injection were read by some as evidence that not everything lives at the synapse.[^glanzman2018]synapse.[^glanzman2018] Whatever the resolution, it sets the resolution the scan must reach.However that question is settled, the answer sets the resolution the scan must reach. Two further complications are routinely underweighted: neuromodulators act by volume transmission,Two further complications are routinely underweighted: neuromodulators act by volume transmission,so the quantity that matters is a concentration field rather than a connection, and glia modulateso the quantity that matters is a concentration field rather than a connection, and glia modulatelines 105–111 → 105–11111 unchanged lines not shown
## The copy problem## The copy problem Suppose the emulation runs and behaves indistinguishably. If the original brain still exists, thereSuppose the emulation runs and behaves indistinguishably. If the original brain still exists, thereare plainly two beings, and the emulation is a copy — which suggests that in the destructive case itare plainly two beings, and the emulation is a copy, which suggests that in the destructive case itis also a copy, merely one with no competitor. Derek Parfit's response is to deny that the questionis also a copy, merely one with no competitor. Derek Parfit's response is to deny that the questionhas a further answer: what matters in survival is psychological continuity and connectedness, andhas a further answer: what matters in survival is psychological continuity and connectedness, andidentity is not a deep fact over and above these.[^parfit1984] On that view the copy carriesidentity is not a deep fact over and above these.[^parfit1984] On that view the copy carrieslines 120–126 → 120–1268 unchanged lines not shown
## Why most neuroscientists are skeptical## Why most neuroscientists are skeptical The mainstream position is not that uploading is impossible but that it is nowhere close, and thatThe mainstream position is that uploading is nowhere close (not that it is impossible), and thatthe confident dates circulating in [[transhumanism]] and [[singularitarianism]] have no basis in thethe confident dates circulating in [[transhumanism]] and [[singularitarianism]] have no basis in thestate of the science. The objections to the engineering itself are catalogued in the article onstate of the science. The objections to the engineering itself are catalogued in the article onwhole brain emulation: the single-neuron model is unsettled, chemical signalling is invisible to awhole brain emulation: the single-neuron model is unsettled, chemical signalling is invisible to alines 143–149 → 143–14916 unchanged lines not shown
**Destroying the original removes the reference standard.** Ordinary engineering validates a model**Destroying the original removes the reference standard.** Ordinary engineering validates a modelagainst the system it models. Here the system is consumed by the measurement, so the only remainingagainst the system it models. Here the system is consumed by the measurement, so the only remainingcheck is whether the emulation strikes people who knew the person as being that person — a test thatcheck is whether the emulation strikes people who knew the person as being that person, a test thata sufficiently good imitation also passes. Staged validation on animals, the standard proposal, hasa sufficiently good imitation also passes. Staged validation on animals, the standard proposal, hasnot begun.not begun. lines 172–187 → 172–18722 unchanged lines not shown
## Culture, institutions, and claims## Culture, institutions, and claims The idea entered wide circulation through fiction — Arthur C. Clarke's stored citizens, RudyThe idea entered wide circulation through fiction (Arthur C. Clarke's stored citizens, RudyRucker's *Software*, Greg Egan's *Permutation City* — and through advocacy. The CarboncopiesRucker's *Software*, Greg Egan's *Permutation City*) and through advocacy. The CarboncopiesFoundation promotes substrate-independent minds as a research programme; Russia's 2045 InitiativeFoundation promotes substrate-independent minds as a research programme; Russia's 2045 Initiativeannounced a staged plan culminating in uploaded consciousness by 2045, with no published technicalannounced a staged plan culminating in uploaded consciousness by 2045, with no published technicalprogress. Economist Robin Hanson's *The Age of Em* takes emulation as given and works out theprogress. Economist Robin Hanson's *The Age of Em* takes emulation as given and works out theeconomics of a world in which copies are cheap, which is useful as an exploration of consequenceseconomics of a world in which copies are cheap, which is useful as an exploration of consequencesand is explicitly not a forecast that emulation will arrive.[^hanson2016]and is explicitly not a forecast that emulation will arrive.[^hanson2016] Uploading is also the strongest form of [[digital-immortality]], and the weakest form — a languageUploading is also the strongest form of [[digital-immortality]], and the weakest form, a languagemodel trained on someone's messages — is routinely marketed using the same vocabulary. Themodel trained on someone's messages, is routinely marketed using the same vocabulary. Theconflation matters: one is a hypothetical continuation of a person, the other is a stylisticconflation matters: one is a hypothetical continuation of a person, the other is a stylisticimitation with no claim to continuity.imitation with no claim to continuity. lines 193–200 → 193–2005 unchanged lines not shown
subjective time becomes a resource that can be bought, which connects the topic tosubjective time becomes a resource that can be bought, which connects the topic to[[access-and-inequality]]. If an emulation can be paused, deleted, or forked, the moral status of[[access-and-inequality]]. If an emulation can be paused, deleted, or forked, the moral status ofthose operations depends on whether it is conscious, and no test for that exists. And if uploadsthose operations depends on whether it is conscious, and no test for that exists. And if uploadsare possible at all, questions about ending one's own existence — treated underare possible at all, questions about ending one's own existence, treated under[[right-to-die-and-right-to-live]] — arise in a form the law has never faced, since deletion,[[right-to-die-and-right-to-live]], arise in a form the law has never faced, since deletion,suspension, and restoration from backup are all available.suspension, and restoration from backup are all available. The prior question remains empirical and unanswered: whether there is any level of description atThe prior question remains empirical and unanswered: whether there is any level of description atremoved, struck through added, underlinedLine numbers count the serialised markdown of each revision, frontmatter included.
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