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status: "contested"status: "contested"horizon: "2030s"horizon: "2030s"categories: ["society", "longevity"]categories: ["society", "longevity"]tags: ["economics", "aging", "policy", "healthspan", "pensions", "geroscience"]tags: ["economics", "aging", "policy", "healthspan", "pensions", "geroscience", "health spending"]summary: "The argument that slowing biological aging would produce economic gains larger than curing any individual disease, and the disputes over how that value is calculated."summary: "The argument that slowing biological aging would produce economic gains larger than curing any individual disease, and the disputes over how that value is calculated and who would pay."updated: "2026-10-29"updated: "2026-11-01"issues: ["The three-year figure for eliminating cancer mortality has no citation.", "Pension-age indexing in Denmark and the Netherlands is stated without a source."]issues: ["The 2006 Scientist article is cited from its listing and secondary quotations, not checked against the original text.", "TAME funding status after the 2024 NPR report needs an official AFAR or NIA source.", "No peer-reviewed valuation published after 2021 has been added."]------ ```infobox```infoboxlines 18–25 → 18–253 unchanged lines not shown
{ "label": "Named in", "value": "2006" }, { "label": "Named in", "value": "2006" }, { "label": "Original authors", "value": "Olshansky, Perry, Miller, Butler" }, { "label": "Original authors", "value": "Olshansky, Perry, Miller, Butler" }, { "label": "Core claim", "value": "Delay aging, not diseases" }, { "label": "Core claim", "value": "Delay aging, not diseases" }, { "label": "Valuation method", "value": "Value of statistical life" }, { "label": "Valuation methods", "value": "Value of statistical life; $ per life-year" }, { "label": "Largest published estimate", "value": "Tens of trillions of dollars" }, { "label": "Largest published estimate", "value": "US$367 trillion (10 extra years, US)" }, { "label": "Main dispute", "value": "Whether the value is fiscal" } { "label": "Main dispute", "value": "Whether the value is fiscal" } ] ]}}lines 29–77 → 29–993 unchanged lines not shown
## The competing-risks argument## The competing-risks argument The technical core is simple and largely undisputed. Age-related diseases compete, so a person spared one dies of another. Modelling the elimination of cancer produces a smaller gain in life expectancy than intuition suggests, because the cohort that survives it remains at high risk of cardiovascular disease, dementia, and frailty. Attacking the shared upstream process, described in the [[hallmarks-of-aging]], shifts the whole risk profile instead of removing one branch of it.The technical core is simple and largely undisputed. Age-related diseases compete, so a person spared one dies of another. Modelling the elimination of [[cancer]] produces a smaller gain in life expectancy than intuition suggests, because the cohort that survives it remains at high risk of cardiovascular disease, dementia, and frailty. Attacking the shared upstream process, described in the [[hallmarks-of-aging]], shifts the whole risk profile instead of removing one branch of it. It follows that disease-specific research faces diminishing returns in a way that geroscience does not. A US modelling study published in 2013 compared a delayed-aging scenario against scenarios in which cancer or heart disease were substantially delayed, and found the aging scenario produced both more years of life and a larger share of those years free of disability, valued at roughly seven trillion dollars in social benefit over fifty years.[^goldman2013] That paper is the origin of the dividend's quantitative form. > [!key] Why disease-by-disease has a ceiling> [!key] Why disease-by-disease has a ceiling> Life-table arithmetic implies that eliminating all cancer mortality would add roughly three years to US life expectancy at birth. That is a real gain, but far smaller than the disease's salience suggests, because the people saved remain old.> US cause-elimination life tables for 1999-2001 found that removing cancer as a cause of death would raise life expectancy at birth by more than three years, and removing heart disease by almost four.[^arias2013] Those are real gains, but far smaller than the diseases' salience suggests, because the people saved remain old. The 2006 proposal promised more than health. Promoting it at a September 2006 symposium, the Alliance for Aging Research, a Washington advocacy group whose executive director Daniel Perry was a co-author, reported Olshansky as saying the dividend would include lower health care costs, higher savings and greater worker productivity, and stated that less than 0.1% of the National Institutes of Health's $28 billion 2006 budget went to the biology of aging.[^aar2006] The health-cost part of that promise is the one later research has tested most directly. ## The Goldman simulation A 2013 study by Dana Goldman, David Cutler, Olshansky and colleagues gave the argument its best-known quantitative form.[^goldman2013] It used the Future Elderly Model, a microsimulation of older Americans' health and spending, to compare a status quo against scenarios in which cancer or heart disease incidence fell by 25% between 2010 and 2030, and a hypothetical "delayed aging" scenario. The delayed-aging assumptions are specific. Mortality and the onset of six chronic conditions and disability were cut by 1.25% for each year of life lived above age fifty, phased in from 2010 to 2030; the slope of intrinsic mortality at ages 15 to 50 fell by 20% by 2050. Every intervention was assumed to cost nothing, and cumulative figures were discounted at 3% a year. No such intervention exists; the authors call the scenario hypothetical. Under those assumptions, life expectancy at age 51 in 2030 rose from 35.8 years to 38.0, against about one extra year in each disease scenario. Valuing the extra quality-adjusted life years at $100,000 each gave a social benefit of about $7.1 trillion over fifty years. The disease-specific scenarios showed diminishing returns, which the authors attributed mainly to competing risks. The same model also asks whether slowing aging saves public money, and in it the answer is no. Per capita Medicare spending was lower in the delayed-aging scenario, but more people survived to qualify for programmes, so aggregate spending rose: delayed aging added nearly $420 billion to the entitlement deficit in 2060, 70% of it from Medicare and Medicaid. The authors found that raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 68 and the Social Security normal retirement age from 67 to 68 would more than offset the extra cost. ## The large valuations## The large valuations The most-cited figure comes from a 2021 analysis by Andrew Scott, Martin Ellison, and David Sinclair, which valued improvements in the aging process using the standard economic method for pricing mortality risk.[^scott2021] Their headline results are that a one-year increase in life expectancy achieved by slowing aging is worth on the order of tens of trillions of dollars to the US population, that larger delays are worth proportionally more, and that the value increases as the intervention is applied to successive cohorts because each benefits from the improvements made for the last.The most-cited figures come from a 2021 analysis by Andrew Scott, Martin Ellison, and [[david-sinclair|David Sinclair]] in *Nature Aging*.[^scott2021] Their model is calibrated to US data, with life expectancy at birth of 78.9 years, healthy life expectancy of 68.5 years and an average value of statistical life of US$11.5 million for adults aged 25 to 65. Summed over the 2017 US population and future births, a slowdown in aging that adds one year of life expectancy is worth US$37.6 trillion and one that adds ten years US$366.8 trillion, usually rounded to $38 trillion and $367 trillion. Using a 2% interest rate, the authors convert the ten-year figure to US$7.2 trillion a year, 33.6% of 2019 GDP. The paper's comparative finding matters more. Interventions that extend life without improving health (the Struldbrugg scenario, named for Swift's immortals) are worth much less, and can be worth negative amounts once disability costs are counted. Value depends almost entirely on whether [[healthspan]] gains keep pace with lifespan gains, and the field has not answered that empirical question.The paper compares three idealised cases. In the "Struldbrugg" case, named for Swift's immortals, life is extended while health declines at the usual rate; in the "Dorian Gray" case health improves within a fixed lifespan; in the "Peter Pan" case aging itself slows. An extra year of healthy life expectancy was always worth more than an extra year of life expectancy, and slowing aging was worth more than extending life alone. The Struldbrugg values were lower but still positive, so the model does not show that extending life in poor health has negative value. The authors also simulated [[metformin]], using effect sizes from an observational study of 41,204 men with diabetes whose average age was 75, and found benefits often matching or exceeding complete eradication of cancer, dementia or cardiovascular disease. They state that metformin's efficacy awaits confirmation from trials such as TAME, and that their dollar values are sensitive to calibration while the ranking of treatments is not. They describe a "virtuous circle" in which better aging raises the value of further improvement, although in their own table a second slowdown in 2050 is worth about 1-2% less than the first for small gains. Sinclair discloses commercial interests in several longevity companies. ## How the numbers are made## How the numbers are made The valuations use the value of a statistical life, a figure derived from what people demonstrably pay to reduce small risks of death, such as wage premiums for dangerous work and spending on safety equipment. US regulatory agencies use values on the order of ten million dollars per statistical life. Multiplying a per-person willingness to pay by a population produces very large aggregates very quickly.The valuations rest on the value of a statistical life, a figure derived from what people pay to reduce small risks of death, such as wage premiums for dangerous work. Scott and colleagues chose it partly because government agencies already use it to evaluate policies.[^scott2021] Goldman's team used a simpler price per quality-adjusted life year. Either way, multiplying a per-person value by a population produces very large aggregates very quickly. The method is standard in regulatory cost-benefit analysis, and its results are frequently misread. The resulting number is an aggregate of what people would notionally pay for a risk reduction: a measure of welfare rather than output. It does not appear in an economy as money, it is not tax revenue, and no government could spend it as a budget. Reporting a longevity dividend "worth $38 trillion" alongside figures for national GDP, as coverage routinely does, compares quantities of different kinds.The resulting number is a measure of welfare, not output. It is an aggregate of what people would notionally pay for a risk reduction; it does not appear in an economy as money, it is not tax revenue, and no government could spend it as a budget. Setting a $38 trillion dividend beside national GDP compares quantities of different kinds, which is why the annualised GDP share in the Scott paper is a scale reference rather than a forecast of income. A separate and more tractable question is the fiscal one: what happens to public budgets. The answer depends almost entirely on labour force participation. Extended healthy working life raises output and contributions; extended life without extended work raises pension and care outlays. The dividend argument assumes the former, and that assumption concerns institutions rather than biology.A separate and more tractable question is the fiscal one: what happens to public budgets. The Goldman simulation suggests that health spending per person falls while total spending and pension outlays rise, and that in the one fix the authors modelled, raising the Medicare and Social Security eligibility ages, the gap more than closes. The dividend argument assumes such changes will happen, and that assumption concerns institutions rather than biology. ## Would slowing aging cut health spending? A popular version of the argument holds that slowing aging would make most medical care unnecessary and that governments would fund it because young bodies are cheaper. The evidence supports a narrower claim. Spending does concentrate in old age. In the United States in 2020, people aged 65 and over were 17% of the population and accounted for 37% of personal health care spending, $22,356 per person; per capita spending on those over 85 ($35,995) was more than 8.5 times that on children ($4,217).[^cms2020] The other 63% went to people under 65, and the 2020 figures do not separate out the effects of COVID-19. Globally, 92 diseases whose adult incidence rises steeply with age accounted for 51.3% of the disease burden among adults in 2017, measured in disability-adjusted life years.[^chang2019] On the geroscience premise, slowing aging would act mainly on that half; most injuries and infections, mental disorders and maternity care fall outside it. Much of the age gradient reflects closeness to death. A 1999 Swiss study of people who died between 1983 and 1992 found that spending in the last two years of life depended on remaining lifetime rather than calendar age, at least beyond 65, and its authors called population aging a possible "red herring" for health spending.[^zweifel1999] English hospital data later showed proximity to death acting as a proxy for morbidity.[^howdon2018] On this reading, postponing death moves the costly final period later instead of removing it. Lifetime totals point the same way. Using US Medicare survey data, a 70-year-old with no functional limitation had a life expectancy of 14.3 years and expected cumulative health spending of about $136,000 (1998 dollars), against 11.6 years and about $145,000 for someone limited in at least one activity of daily living.[^lubitz2003] A Dutch simulation found lifetime health spending highest for healthy-living nonsmokers, lowest for smokers and intermediate for obese people, because the healthier groups lived longer and incurred costs for unrelated diseases in the added years.[^vanbaal2008] Healthier lives may cost about the same as less healthy ones, or more; the economic case for slowing aging is the value of the extra healthy years, not a smaller health budget. ## Counterarguments## Counterarguments **Morbidity has expanded rather than compressed.** James Fries proposed in 1980 that medical progress would push the onset of disability toward a fixed lifespan limit, compressing illness into a short terminal period.[^fries1980] Demographic evidence over the following decades has mostly not supported it: gains in life expectancy have generally been accompanied by comparable or larger gains in years lived with disease, and the global gap between total life expectancy and healthy life expectancy has stayed on the order of a decade without narrowing much. [[compression-of-morbidity]] examines the evidence. If geroprotective drugs behave like the medical advances that preceded them, they would extend both curves together, which is the scenario the valuations price at close to zero.**Morbidity has not clearly compressed.** James Fries proposed in 1980 that medical progress would push the onset of disability toward a fixed lifespan limit, compressing illness into a short terminal period.[^fries1980] Scott and colleagues read Global Burden of Disease data as showing that the proportion of life in good health has stayed broadly constant, implying more years in poor health.[^scott2021] [[compression-of-morbidity]] examines the evidence. If geroprotective drugs behave like earlier medical advances, they would extend both curves together, the Struldbrugg-like outcome the valuations price lowest. **The dependency ratio.** Populations in most high-income and many middle-income countries are aging because fertility has fallen, not because old-age mortality has, a demographic point developed in [[overpopulation-and-longevity]]. Adding years at the end without changing retirement norms increases the ratio of non-working to working people. Several countries, Denmark and the Netherlands among them, have already indexed statutory pension ages to life expectancy, which converts longevity gains into working years automatically and is the policy the dividend argument implies.**Pensions.** Adding years at the end without changing retirement norms raises pension outlays; the demographic causes of population aging are covered in [[overpopulation-and-longevity]]. By 2023 one in four OECD countries linked statutory retirement ages to life expectancy, among them Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.[^oecd2023] Denmark's one-to-one link projects a normal retirement age of 74 for a man entering the labour market in 2022. The OECD notes that the Netherlands moved to a slower two-thirds link before its link took effect and warns that the political sustainability of one-to-one links may be weak; discussions were under way in Denmark on moving to a slower link. Automatic indexing is the policy the dividend argument implies, and its durability is untested. **There is no drug to fund.** The dividend is an argument for research rather than a description of an available intervention, and it should not be confused with the much stronger claim examined in [[longevity-escape-velocity]]. No pharmaceutical has been shown to slow aging in humans, and the [[glp-1-receptor-agonists]], sometimes offered as a counter-example, treat metabolic disease rather than aging. [[metformin]] has an observational signal and a trial designed to test it that has never been fully funded; [[senolytics]] have produced modest or null results in the human studies reported so far; [[rapamycin]] has strong mouse data and no completed long-term human outcome trial; unregulated practices such as [[heat-and-cold-exposure|sauna and cold-water immersion]] rest on observational cohorts and short-term physiological measures rather than outcome trials. The best-supported geroprotector remains the one described in [[exercise-and-aging]], which requires no research funding at all.**There is no drug to fund.** The dividend is an argument for research rather than a description of an available intervention, and it should not be confused with the much stronger claim examined in [[longevity-escape-velocity]]. No pharmaceutical has been shown to slow aging in humans, and in 2024 NPR reported that the US Food and Drug Administration did not recognise aging as a disease to treat.[^aubrey2024] The [[glp-1-receptor-agonists]], sometimes offered as a counter-example, treat metabolic disease rather than aging. Metformin has an observational signal and a trial designed to test it, TAME, planned to enrol 3,000 people aged 65 to 79 for six years; in 2024 NPR reported that the National Institute on Aging had set aside about $5 million against an estimated cost of $45 million to $70 million, and [[nir-barzilai]] said that because metformin is generic, no company stands to profit from the trial; he had turned to philanthropists and foundations and had some pledges. [[senolytics]] have produced modest or null results in the human studies reported so far; [[rapamycin]] has strong mouse data and no completed long-term human outcome trial; unregulated practices such as [[heat-and-cold-exposure|sauna and cold-water immersion]] rest on observational cohorts and short-term physiological measures rather than outcome trials. The best-supported geroprotector remains the one described in [[exercise-and-aging]], which requires no research funding at all. **Distribution.** A dividend accruing mostly to populations that already live longest would widen the existing gap in life expectancy between rich and poor. Nothing in the argument's structure addresses who receives the years, a problem developed in [[access-and-inequality]].**Distribution.** A dividend accruing mostly to populations that already live longest would widen the existing gap in life expectancy between rich and poor. Nothing in the argument's structure addresses who receives the years, a problem developed in [[access-and-inequality]]. > [!debate] What the estimate is for> [!debate] What the estimate is for> Supporters treat the trillion-dollar figures as evidence that aging research is systematically underfunded relative to its expected return. Critics note that the same method applied to any large mortality reduction produces similar numbers, so the figure demonstrates that mortality is valuable rather than that geroscience will deliver.> Supporters treat the trillion-dollar figures as evidence that aging research is systematically underfunded relative to its expected return. Critics note that the same method applied to any large mortality reduction produces similar numbers, so the figure demonstrates that mortality is valuable rather than that geroscience will deliver. Neither side's figures show a fiscal saving: the one US simulation cited here with a budget line finds higher total entitlement spending unless eligibility ages rise. ## Policy implications## Policy implications The dividend argument has had two concrete effects. First, it supplied the rationale for treating aging as a legitimate indication in regulatory terms, the reasoning behind [[metformin|the proposed TAME trial]] designed by [[nir-barzilai]] and colleagues, structured less to demonstrate efficacy than to establish that a regulator would accept an aging-related composite endpoint at all. Second, it shaped prize competitions and philanthropic funding: the endpoints chosen by [[xprize-healthspan]] are functional restoration in muscle, cognition, and immunity rather than lifespan, precisely because functional years are what the economics values.The dividend argument has had two concrete effects. First, it supplied the rationale for treating aging as a legitimate indication in regulatory terms, the reasoning behind [[metformin|the proposed TAME trial]], structured less to demonstrate efficacy than to establish that a regulator would accept an aging-related composite endpoint at all. Second, it shaped prize competitions and philanthropic funding: the endpoints chosen by [[xprize-healthspan]] are functional restoration in muscle, cognition, and immunity rather than lifespan, precisely because functional years are what the economics values. It has not yet moved public research budgets appreciably. National aging-research institutes remain funded well below cancer and cardiovascular programmes in most countries, and the disease-specific structure of medical research funding has proved resistant to the competing-risks argument that undermines it.Its effect on public research budgets is harder to show. The disease-specific structure of medical research funding has proved resistant to the competing-risks argument, and the fiscal results above suggest why a finance ministry might hesitate: the welfare gain is large and diffuse, while the extra pension and health outlays land on public budgets unless eligibility ages move. ## The unresolved question## The unresolved question The argument turns on whether an intervention that extends life also extends health, and the field has no accepted way to measure that in advance. [[aging-biomarkers]] describes the search for a surrogate endpoint that regulators would accept; without one, a trial testing the dividend's central premise would need to run for decades on hard outcomes. Until such a trial exists, the economic case rests on an assumption about biology that the biological evidence has not yet confirmed.The argument turns on whether an intervention that extends life also extends health, and the field has no accepted way to measure that in advance. [[aging-biomarkers]] describes the search for a surrogate endpoint that regulators would accept; without one, a trial testing the dividend's central premise would need to run for decades on hard outcomes. Until such a trial exists, the economic case rests on an assumption about biology that the biological evidence has not yet confirmed, and the fiscal case rests on a second assumption, about retirement ages, that politics has not yet confirmed either. ## See also## See also lines 86–93 → 108–1258 unchanged lines not shown
## References## References [^olshansky2006]: `paper` Olshansky, S.J., Perry, D., Miller, R.A., Butler, R.N. "In Pursuit of the Longevity Dividend." *The Scientist*, 2006. {A position piece proposing a research policy; the seven-year delay is a stipulated scenario rather than a result from any study.}[^olshansky2006]: `paper` Olshansky, S.J., Perry, D., Miller, R.A., Butler, R.N. "In Pursuit of the Longevity Dividend." *The Scientist*, 20, 28-36, 2006. {A position piece proposing a research policy; the seven-year delay is a stipulated scenario rather than a result from any study.}[^goldman2013]: `paper` Goldman, D.P. et al. "Substantial Health and Economic Returns from Delayed Aging May Warrant a New Focus for Medical Research." *Health Affairs*, 2013. {A microsimulation of US scenarios, not a trial; the delayed-aging case assumes an intervention that does not exist.}[^aar2006]: `statement` Alliance for Aging Research. "In Pursuit of the 'Longevity Dividend'." Press release, 12 September 2006. https://www.agingresearch.org/news/in-pursuit-of-the-longevity-dividend/ {An advocacy group's announcement of the proposal; the NIH funding share is its own figure, not an audited breakdown.}[^scott2021]: `paper` Scott, A.J., Ellison, M., Sinclair, D.A. "The economic value of targeting aging." *Nature Aging*, 2021. {The trillion-dollar figures are aggregated willingness to pay for reduced mortality risk, not output, revenue or any sum a budget could contain.}[^goldman2013]: `paper` Goldman, D.P., Cutler, D., Rowe, J.W., Michaud, P.C., Sullivan, J., Peneva, D., Olshansky, S.J. "Substantial Health and Economic Returns from Delayed Aging May Warrant a New Focus for Medical Research." *Health Affairs*, 32(10), 1698-1705, 2013. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0052 {A microsimulation of US scenarios, not a trial; the delayed-aging case assumes a cost-free intervention that does not exist.}[^fries1980]: `paper` Fries, J.F. "Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity." *New England Journal of Medicine*, 1980.[^arias2013]: `report` Arias, E., Heron, M., Tejada-Vera, B. "United States Life Tables Eliminating Certain Causes of Death, 1999-2001." *National Vital Statistics Reports*, 61(9), National Center for Health Statistics, 2013. PMID 24968617 {Period life tables for 1999-2001; removing a cause in a table assumes other causes are unaffected.}[^scott2021]: `paper` Scott, A.J., Ellison, M., Sinclair, D.A. "The economic value of targeting aging." *Nature Aging*, 1, 616-623, 2021. doi:10.1038/s43587-021-00080-0 {The trillion-dollar figures are aggregated willingness to pay for reduced mortality risk, not output, revenue or any sum a budget could contain.}[^cms2020]: `report` Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. "U.S. Personal Health Care Spending by Age and Sex: 2020 Highlights." National Health Expenditure Data. {Covers personal health care only; CMS notes the 2020 estimates do not separate COVID-19 effects from demographic factors.}[^chang2019]: `paper` Chang, A.Y., Skirbekk, V.F., Tyrovolas, S., Kassebaum, N.J., Dieleman, J.L. "Measuring population ageing: an analysis of the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017." *Lancet Public Health*, 4(3), e159-e167, 2019. doi:10.1016/S2468-2667(19)30019-2 {Age-related diseases are defined statistically, as those whose adult incidence rises quadratically with age.}[^zweifel1999]: `paper` Zweifel, P., Felder, S., Meiers, M. "Ageing of population and health care expenditure: a red herring?" *Health Economics*, 8(6), 485-496, 1999. PMID 10544314 {Data on people who died in 1983-1992; the finding concerns spending in the last eight quarters of life, beyond age 65.}[^howdon2018]: `paper` Howdon, D., Rice, N. "Health care expenditures, age, proximity to death and morbidity: Implications for an ageing population." *Journal of Health Economics*, 57, 60-74, 2018. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.11.001 {English inpatient hospital spending only, in two samples of about 40,000 people who died within the study window.}[^lubitz2003]: `paper` Lubitz, J., Cai, L., Kramarow, E., Lentzner, H. "Health, life expectancy, and health care spending among the elderly." *New England Journal of Medicine*, 349(11), 1048-1055, 2003. doi:10.1056/NEJMsa020614 {Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data from 1992-1998, simulated from age 70; dollar figures are in 1998 dollars.}[^vanbaal2008]: `paper` van Baal, P.H. et al. "Lifetime medical costs of obesity: prevention no cure for increasing health expenditure." *PLoS Medicine*, 5(2), e29, 2008. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050029 {A simulation model built mainly on Dutch data, covering health care costs and not pensions or productivity.}[^fries1980]: `paper` Fries, J.F. "Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity." *New England Journal of Medicine*, 303, 130-135, 1980. doi:10.1056/NEJM198007173030304[^oecd2023]: `report` OECD. *Pensions at a Glance 2023: OECD and G20 Indicators*. OECD Publishing, Paris, 2023. doi:10.1787/678055dd-en {Projected retirement ages assume legislated life-expectancy links are applied as written and projected gains materialise.}[^aubrey2024]: `news` Aubrey, A. "A cheap drug may slow down aging. A study will determine if it works." NPR, 22 April 2024. {Funding and cost figures are as reported in April 2024; the trial's later funding status is not covered.} removed, struck through added, underlinedLine numbers count the serialised markdown of each revision, frontmatter included.
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